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The Research Institute of Applied Economics (IREA) in Barcelona was founded in 2005, as a research 
institute in applied economics. Three consolidated research groups make up the institute: AQR, RISK and 
GiM, and a large number of members are involved in the Institute. IREA focuses on four priority lines of 
investigation: (i) the quantitative study of regional and urban economic activity and analysis of regional and 
local economic policies, (ii) study of public economic activity in markets, particularly in the fields of 
empirical evaluation of privatization, the regulation and competition in the markets of public services using 
state of industrial economy, (iii) risk analysis in finance and insurance, and (iv) the development of micro 
and macro econometrics applied for the analysis of economic activity, particularly for quantitative 
evaluation of public policies. 
IREA Working Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation 
of such a paper should account for its provisional character. For that reason, IREA Working Papers may not 
be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author. A revised version may be available 
directly from the author. 
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IREA. Research published in this 
series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.
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Abstract 
 
Problem: Public-private-partnerships in transport 
infrastructure characteristically increase user-fees. PPP 
projects are usually considered as isolated facilities, even 
though in most cases they belong to a network. Hence, 
the network effects of the use of PPPs and increased 
tolls tend to be neglected.  
Purpose: We aim to identify the network effects of the 
use of PPPs and increased user tolls in road 
infrastructure. We empirically examine and demonstrate 
network effects due to network infrastructure pricing, 
and draw lessons for users and planners. To do so, we 
focus on the effects of pricing on users of alternative 
roads, paying special attention to traffic composition 
and safety. 
Methods: We study the increases in user tolls on 
motorways due to the use of PPPs in the US. To show 
the effects of user tolls, we also examine micro data for 
toll motorways in Spain and assess the consequences of 
pricing and PPP design for the Spanish road network. 
Results and conclusions: Among other things, the 
monetization of motorways is associated with an 
increase in toll levels that has consequences for their 
users, and also for the rest of the sections of the 
network. We show that pricing high-quality roads 
without considering their role inside the road network 
increases volumes of heavy traffic and accidents on non-
tolled lower-quality alternative roads. Analyzing the 
network as a whole, and not just the PPP section, we see 
that toll increases due to PPPs have negative 
consequences in terms of efficiency, traffic composition, 
and road safety. 
Takeaway for practice: Policy makers who decide to 
impose tolls on the best roads should invest more in 
maintenance and quality elsewhere in the system in 
order to improve safety in the adjacent alternative routes 
which receive traffic diverted from the tolled motorway. 
An alternative for regulators is internalizing accident 
externalities by lowering tolls to improve safety in the 
corridor. 
Keywords: Private-Public-Partnerships; Monetization; Toll Roads; Networks. 
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1. Introduction 
On June 2011 Goldman Sachs (55%) and Spain’s largest toll road operator - Abertis (45%)- have 
won the bid to operate two Puerto Rico toll roads. The winning consortium will pay US$ 1.08 
billion for the lease, which makes this deal the third largest public-private partnership involving 
existing toll roads in the US, after the Indiana Toll Road lease in 2006 (US$ 3.85 billion) and the 
Chicago Skyway lease in 2005 (US$ 1.83 billion). The concession length is for 40 years, and tolls 
are set to rise annually by Consumer Price Index plus 1.5%. Because of this, the real price (CPI 
adjusted) of those toll roads will increase by 79% by the end of the concession period (real price 
would double in 48 years). 
Indeed, the fiscal restrictions that governments face are the leading drivers of privatization and 
public-private-partnerships worldwide. In the past, US local governments made extensive use of 
contracting out policies in order to ease fiscal constraints. Recently, public-private-partnership1
contracts in state-wide transport infrastructure have been implemented, with the same aims in 
mind: to raise money, to undertake necessary investments, and to rely more on user fees than on 
budgetary funding.
However, policy makers usually make the assumption that PPP infrastructure projects are isolated 
facilities, when the fact is that they belong to a network. This myopic approach has important 
consequences for the management and planning of the network as a whole which must be borne 
in mind in order to make the appropriate decisions for PPP design. 
This article reviews recent monetization operations in network infrastructure services in US, 
focusing in particular on transportation projects where PPP agreements have been used the most. 
We examine the effects and challenges for planners of these policies with regard to the design 
and management of contracts, equity impacts and the political acceptability of pricing, and the 
externalities generated and internalized by the user fee approach.  
In the second part of the study we also examine the experience of Spain, a pioneering country in 
the world to privatize its road transport infrastructure network, in order to empirically examine the 
network effects of infrastructure pricing and its consequences for users and planners. To do so, 
1 See Siemiatycki (2010) for a detailed typology of PPPs
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we use micro data for toll motorways in Spain and trace the consequences of their pricing and 
PPP design for the Spanish road network.  
This exercise highlights the limitations of the current approach to PPP contracts for network 
infrastructure in the US and their potential consequences for planners and users. Among other 
things, monetization is associated with an increase of toll levels which has consequences not only 
for its users, but for the rest of the network sections as well. Equity considerations and political 
interests may also affect its implementation and its network effects. In fact, we show that pricing 
transport infrastructure such as roads without considering their network nature has negative 
consequences in terms of efficiency, traffic composition, and road safety when the whole network, 
not only the PPP section, is analyzed. 
This article provides the necessary tools for understanding and deriving maximum benefit from 
private participation in infrastructure projects, while avoiding the common pitfalls that may 
undermine its success. 
2. PPPs and monetization in the US 
Toll roads represent a small fraction of all limited access roads (divided highways) in the US. Out 
of 68,000 miles of limited access roads US (of which 47,000 miles belong to the Interstate 
Highway System, or IHS), just over 8% are tolled (Cox and Love, 1996). Whereas most of the 
roads in the IHS were built and are maintained by gasoline taxes collected by the Federal and 
State governments, there are also around 3,000 miles of HIS tolled motorways, such as the 
Indiana Toll Road, the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the New Jersey Turnpike, and the Chicago 
Skyway. These motorways were built and financed by State and municipal governments and 
agencies. Only a very small number of toll roads in the US, such as the Dulles Greenway 
(connecting Washington DC, Dulles Airport and Leesburg, Virginia) have been built, owned, or 
operated by the private sector.
Public-private-partnerships have been increasingly used in recent years in many public services in 
the US, and particularly in transportation services (Albalate, Bel and Geddes, 2011). There are 
several reasons for the use of public-private-partnerships, the most important of which are the 
financial restrictions on State and local governments. Many governments have sought to obtain 
private funds (Hodge and Greve, 2007) either to undertake necessary investments or to use them 
for other purposes related to public finance. For their part, private investors have shown interest in 
transportation services, and in particular in toll motorways, which present desirable investment 
characteristics such as long-term deals and increasing revenues. Within this context, several 
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privatizations of toll motorways have been implemented in the US. Two illustrative examples are 
the Chicago Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road. 
The Chicago Skyway 
The Chicago Skyway is a 7.8-mile long elevated roadway and ½ mile bridge facility that connects 
the western end of the Indiana Toll Road with the non-tolled Dan Ryan Expressway, which 
provides access to downtown Chicago. The City of Chicago built and financed the Chicago 
Skyway in the mid-1950s, at a cost of US$ 101 million (1958; US$ 764 million at 2010 prices). It 
was opened for traffic in 1958.  
Between 2001 and 2004 the Chicago authorities spent US$ 250 million to rebuild much of the 
Skyway. In early 2004 the City government decided to lease the Skyway to a private operator, the 
main aim being to raise cash by means of an upfront concession rent, which was to be used by 
the City to fund various municipal needs. In March 2004 a Request of Concessionaire 
Qualifications was issued as the first step in the privatization process. Bids from several qualified 
bidders were received by the City in October 2004. The winning bid was made by the consortium 
formed by Cintra Concesiones de Infraestructuras de Transporte S.A. (a Spanish toll motorways 
operator) and Macquarie Investment Holdings (an Australian investment company).  
The concession transaction was completed in January 2005. Table 1 below presents financial 
and corporate information on the Chicago Skyway both before privatization and about 
privatization2. The Skyway concession was structured to maximize the concession price. The City 
of Chicago obtained US$ 1.83 billion; this amount was 63.1 times its EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, depreciation and amortization), a multiplier much larger than that obtained in 
contemporary motorway privatization in other countries such as France (Bel and Foote, 2009). 
After privatization, tolls on the Skyway will increase well above the CPI until 2017 according to the 
pre-established toll schedule, and after 2017 tolls can be adjusted annually by 2%, by the change 
in CPI, or by the change in nominal GDP per capita, whichever is the largest. 
[Insert table 1 about here]
2 Detailed information and analysis on the Chicago Skyway privatization can be found in Enright (2006) and in Bel and 
Foote (2009). 
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The Indiana Toll Road  
The State of Indiana built and financed the Indiana Toll Road (ITR) during the 1950s. The toll 
motorway opened for traffic in stages, east to west, between August and November 1956. It is 
157 miles in length and runs across the northern part of Indiana between the borders with Ohio 
and Illinois. The toll motorway was operated by the Indiana Toll Road Commission between 1956 
and 1981, and was then taken over by the Indiana Department of Transportation.  
In 2005 the Indiana government decided to privatize the ITR and in September of that year a 
Request for Toll Road Concessionaire Proposals was issued. As in the case of Chicago Skyway, 
the State’s main reason for privatizing the ITR was to obtain an upfront concession rent. In 
contrast to Chicago, though, the objective was to use the upfront payment to partially fund a ten-
year statewide transportation improvement program. The State received four qualified bids in 
January 2006. As in the case of the Chicago Skyway, a consortium of Cintra Concesiones de 
Infraestructuras de Transporte S.A. and Macquarie Investment Holdings was the winning bidder, 
with a bid of US$ 3.85 billion. 
In June 2006, the concession transaction was completed and full operating responsibility for the 
toll road was transferred to the concessionaire Indiana Toll Road Concession Company. The 
lease agreement included a non-compete clause whereby no 20-mile stretch of road within 10 
miles of the Toll Road may be upgraded to a 4-lane divided highway for at least 55 years. The 
agreement also has a provision that allows Cintra-Macquarie to be compensated if other road 
upgrades or any action by the State reduces the income from the toll road. Table 1 presents 
financial and corporate information on the Indiana Toll Road both before privatization and about 
privatization. After privatization tolls can be adjusted annually by 2%, by the change in CPI, or by 
the change in nominal GDP per capita, whichever is the largest. 
So both the Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road have this mechanism for adjusting the tolls 
annually by 2%, by the change in CPI or by the change in nominal GDP per capita.  According to 
Bel and Foote (2009), this will imply an important increase of tolls in real terms in the future.3
Concessionaires on both toll motorways enjoy strong monopolistic characteristics, which give 
them significant latitude to set tolls in order to maximize profits; they have no incentives to set tolls 
to optimize regional mobility or to internalize externalities. Consequently, diverting traffic to 
alternative routes is a likely outcome on both the Skyway (Bel and Foote, 2009) and the ITR 
3 Macroeconomic indicators in the US show that CPI growth is lower than nominal GDP/capita growth. In the 10 years 
before the Skyway privatization, CPI was higher than nominal GDP/capita only in 2002. 
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(Johnson, Luby and Kurbanov, 2007). Therefore, from the regional perspective and with regard to 
external effects, residents in the regions served by the roads are likely to lose out with toll 
motorway privatization.  
3. Network externalities in parallel roads 
Because roads are part of a network, it is not surprising that public intervention on traffic flows 
affects alternative routes. As an illustration, it has been shown that changes in speed limits on one 
set of roads affect the average speed not just on these roads but also on the surrounding roads 
(Richter et al., 2004; Friedman, Barach and Richter, 2007), as well as traffic distribution 
(McCarthy, 2003). 
In turn, as is well known, tolls on high capacity roads shift road users who are not willing to pay for 
the use of the best road (the so-called ‘rat-running’ drivers). Even when the quality and safety 
standards of the toll motorway are higher, tolls encourage widespread diversion onto minor routes 
(May and Milne, 2000). According to Verhoef et al. (1996) this shift is positively related to the 
elasticity of demand and negatively related to the quality of the adjacent road.4 Some road users, 
then, would have used the best road if it had been free (or less expensive) and consequently, 
price increases imply a higher use of low quality roads with relative time delays for road users and 
potential safety loss in the corridor. Several studies have estimated the price elasticity of demand. 
Although it is dependent on several route-specific features, Table 2 (which displays some of the 
most relevant estimates in the literature) helps to identify a mean range of expected elasticities for 
toll motorway projects. 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
Because of the re-routing effect, some government reports and recent academic research have 
expressed concern about the safety consequences of charging or increasing tolls without high 
quality alternatives. For instance, the Department for Transportation Feasibility Study of Road 
Pricing in the UK stressed that “the impact of re-routing […] could in certain places and at certain 
times result in an increase in accident levels. This is due to the increased number of vehicles 
using smaller roads, not built for a high level demand, which could lead to higher accident rates” 
(Department for Transport, 2004; p.143). Broughton and Gower (1998) estimated that a 10 per 
4 As the quality gap between the two roads becomes greater, the more inelastic is the demand for the tolled motorway.
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cent diversion of motorway traffic from the motorways in Kent (UK) would increase the number of 
injury accidents in the entire county by about 3½ per cent.5
In an empirical study, Albalate (2011) confirmed this concern for the Spanish motorway network, 
finding a price elasticity of accidents involving victims on substitute roads of 0.5. This result 
implies that we should expect higher numbers of road crashes in low quality alternative roads 
after toll increases, due to the shift of road users. Furthermore, traffic diversion seems to have a 
more pronounced effect in the case of commercial traffic, particularly heavy vehicles which are 
more sensitive to price increases. Rothengatter (2004) claims that after setting tolls for heavy 
vehicles in Austria, truck traffic was diverted onto streets and roads. This diversion of heavy 
vehicles is another source of concern if we consider that they heighten the risks for the rest of 
drivers on low quality roads adjacent to the tolled motorway. 
Against this background, we would expect the increase of tolls associated with the monetization of 
a motorway to affect not only toll revenues in the sections in question but also traffic distribution 
across substitute roads, that is, alternative routes that belong to the same road  network. These 
impacts can be summarized as the shift of a share of traffic onto alternative routes. The 
magnitude of this effect will depend on the quality gap between the toll motorway and the free 
alternative, but this re-routing is bound to increase the traffic on low quality alternative roads, with 
high percentages of heavy vehicles due to their higher price elasticity. The Spanish experience 
with motorway privatization which we describe in the following section can serve to illustrate this 
situation.
4. Illustration: Spain as the pioneer of motorway privatization 
The Spanish transportation system is unique in the European context. Among its distinctive 
features are a mixed funding model for motorways, which implies the existence of a significant 
share of motorways that are tolled and operated by private concessionaires, and a significant 
share of free motorways under public responsibility and funding.6 This mixed situation does not 
correspond to a unified, planned model, but reflects the various stages through which transport 
5 A previous study by Gower et al. (1998) suggested that a toll of 2.5p per mile (at 1994 prices) would produce a 10% 
diversion level. Linked to this, Broughton and Gower (1998) estimated that this increase in the traffic flow would 
increase the number of injury accidents in the entire county by about 3.5 per cent, taking into account traffic flows and 
alternative road capacities.
6 The presence of toll motorways is significant in other European countries such as France, Greece, Portugal and Italy. 
However, in these countries almost the whole the network is tolled, while in Spain we find significant shares of both 
funding models.  
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policy has passed in Spain.7 The first motorways were awarded to the private sector by the 
dictatorship in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to the lack of public resources for funding the 
investments needed. A second stage began in the early 1980s when the first social-democratic 
governments launched a program for investing in a new network of free motorways, while 
maintaining the private concessions wherever they were in operation. These two periods gave 
shape to the current mixed funding network, together with a new-found enthusiasm for toll funding 
in the late 1990s and the new century, which implied the award of new toll motorways. 
Because of this mixed funding network, the Spanish experience offers the variability necessary to 
illustrate the concerns related to the use of tolls in a motorway network with both toll and free 
alternatives. For this reason, in this section we compare parallel roads with one free or tolled 
motorway (a high capacity road) and a free low quality adjacent alternative (termed national roads
in Spain) in order to illustrate network effects. In this way, we expect to identify traffic diversion 
patterns, particularly regarding heavy vehicles, and the consequences for safety outcomes. Table 
3 displays information for adjacent pairs of the control stations established by the Spanish 
General Traffic Directorate. These stations collect data on traffic volume (average daily traffic), 
their distribution (share of heavy vehicles) and safety outcomes in terms of accidents involving 
victims for a 14 km section (7 km before and after the location of the control station). The 
selection of these check points was based on the existence of adjacent alternatives for interurban 
motorways.8
[Insert table 3 about here] 
This exercise provides interesting insights into the network effects described above. By comparing 
route level data, distinguishing by type of road, one can see that the average daily traffic 
distribution is highly dependent on the charging characteristic of the motorway (the best quality 
road). In this respect, free national roads adjacent to toll motorways enjoy (relatively) more traffic 
than free national roads adjacent to free motorways. This diversion is produced by the toll 
placement, given that the quality gap between the two types of road is significant. In some cases, 
for instance on the routes León-Astorga (AP-71), Lalín-Santiago (AP-53) and Fuengirola-San 
Roque (AP-7S), we even find more vehicles on the free low quality road than by the toll motorway. 
As can be seen in the fourth column, these toll motorways are the most expensive routes. We 
7 See Bel and Fageda (2005) for a fuller description of these stages in the Spanish motorway sector. 
8 Access and urban motorways were not considered in the sample because their urban features and traffic patterns 
could distort the effects we want to identify.
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also observe that in the case of routes where there are no significant time savings, for instance in 
the case of the corridor Barcelona-Lleida (AP-2) with a time loss ratio (see the fifth column) of 
1.06, the market share for both roads (tolled and untolled) is around 50% each.  
As regards the distribution of heavy vehicles across both alternative roads, the data collected by 
the control stations provide a clear picture of how market share is determined by motorway 
pricing. While national roads adjacent to toll motorways receive more than 40% of the heavy 
vehicles driving in most of the corridors considered, when the motorway remains free of charge 
this share drops sharply, as these vehicles shift onto the high quality road. For the most 
expensive motorways the share between the two roads is close to a 50% split; this is also 
influenced by the time loss ratio, since values around 2.0 are correlated with larger percentages of 
traffic on the high quality motorway. 
The final analysis facilitated by the data in table 3 is that of safety outcomes by type of road. 
Once we correct the number of accidents involving victims per 14 km section by traffic (accidents 
with victims per section and corrected per thousand vehicles), we find that national roads always 
suffer more accidents per traffic received than toll and free motorways. Given the larger amount of 
traffic using these low quality alternatives, particularly heavy vehicles, it is easy to estimate the 
death or injury toll established on roads adjacent to toll motorways. Where free motorways are 
available, most drivers can avoid the most dangerous routes. 
5. Conclusions and recommendations
PPPs are being increasingly used in transport infrastructure in the US. The cases of the Chicago 
Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road, together with the recent deal for two Puerto Rico’s toll 
motorways – the three largest privatizations of government-owned motorways in the US–, show 
that monetization is usually linked to increased user fees. This may create negative external 
effects with regard to congestion and driver safety.  
This article emphasizes the need to treat roads as network services in the design and 
management of PPP contracts. We provide the necessary tools for understanding and deriving 
maximum benefit from private participation in infrastructure projects, and highlights factors 
associated with the expected increase in tolls. This allows us to indicate ways of avoiding the 
most common pitfalls that can undermine the success of the project and the undesired 
consequences that can make the planners’ work more difficult or even impossible. The Spanish 
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experience, based on a mixed funding model with free and toll motorways, provides an illustration 
of how charging for the use of the best roads can affect traffic distribution, heavy vehicle route 
choice, and safety outcomes.  
Our findings have important public policy implications in the field of transportation and 
infrastructure management. Policy makers deciding to make use of PPPs and increase tolls on 
the best roads should invest more in maintenance and quality in order to improve safety in the 
adjacent alternative routes which receive traffic diverted from the tolled motorway. In this regard, 
non-compete clauses usually embedded in PPP agreements should – at least – make an 
exception for improvements aimed at increasing safety in the alternative routes. 
An alternative for regulators and transport managers is the internalization of accident externalities 
by lowering tolls so as to improve safety outcomes in the corridor. In our framework, priced-off 
drivers diverted onto lower quality roads are more likely to suffer accidents; the policy of imposing 
tolls on the best infrastructures without taking this effect into consideration may increase overall 
accident rates.  
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TABLES
Table 1: Financial and Corporate pre-privatization and privatization information on Chicago Skyway 
(2004) and Indiana Toll Road (2005). 
Chicago Skyway 
2004 
Indiana Toll Road 
2005 
Established in 1958 1956 
Network length (miles)  7.8 157
Ownership Structure 100% City of Chicago 100% State of Indiana 
Workforce 130 590
Gross Revenues  US$ 41.1 million USD 98.6 million 
EBITDA  US$ 29 million USD 64 million 
EBITDA/Gross Revenues  70.5% 64.6%
Concession length 99 years 75 years 
Concession price US$ 1.83 billion US$ 3.85 billion 
Price as multiple of EBITDA 63.1 60.2
Tolls increase Pre-scheduled until 2017. 
Thereafter, greater of 2%, change 
in CPI or change in nominal GDP 
per capita 
Greater of 2%, change in CPI or 
change in nominal GDP per 
capita
Note: EBITDA: Earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization. 
Sources: Bel and Foote (2009), City of Chicago Financial Reports, Indiana East-West Toll Road Financial 
Analysis (Crowe Chizek and Company LLC, March 7, 2006), and Indiana Toll Road Request for Toll Road 
Concessionaire Proposals. 
Table 2. Toll elasticity of demand provided by relevant empirical studies  
Study Estimate Motorways studied 
Weustefield and Regan (1981) -0.03 / -0.31 16 Toll Facilities in the US 
Goodwin (1988) (quoted in May, 
1992) 
-0.45 Literature review 
Jones and Hervik (1992) -0.22 / -0.45 Ring roads in Norway 
Harvey (1994) -0.10 Toll Motorway Everett, New Hampshire, USA. 
Mauchan and Bonsall (1995) -0.25 / -0.40 Simulation West Yorkshire, UK 
Wilbur Smith and 
Associates (1995) 
-0.1 / -0.35 Toll Motorway Facilities, USA. 
Hirschmann et al. (1995) -0.09 / 0.50 Bridges and Tunnels NYC area, USA. 
TRACE (1997) -0.22 /-0.35 Frence Toll Motorways (>100 Km) 
UTM (2000) -0.20 Toll Motorway New Jersey, USA. 
Burris et al. (2001) -0.03 / 0.36 Lee County, Florida, USA 
Matas and Raymond (2003) -0.21 / -1.31 Interurban Toll Motorways, Spain 
Asensio and Matas (2005) -0.13 / -0.34 Urban Motorways in Barcelona 
Álvarez, Cantos and Garcia (2007) -0.54 Access Toll Motorways to Madrid, Spain 
Odeck and Brathen (2008) -0.45 / -0.82 19 Norwegian road projects 
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Table 3. Comparison between Motorways and their alternatives. Traffic, composition and safety outcomes by 
route 
HIGH CAPACITY ROUTE TRAFFIC  
(Average Daily Traffic) 
PRICE
(Cents 
€/Km)
TIME LOSS RATIO 
(Minutes Free/Minutes 
Tolled) 
Toll Motorway Free National Road Free Motorway 
Barcelona-La Jonquera (AP-7) 58.778 23.677 - 8.7 1.40 
Barcelona-Valencia (AP-7) 41.433 20649 - 10.3 1.78
Valencia-Alacant (AP-7) 30.253 18.040 - 8.5 1.82 
Barcelona-Lleida (AP-2) 44.314 39.707 - 8.6 1.06 
Lleida-Zaragoza (AP-2) 14.538 12.683 - 8.6 1.66
León-Astorga (AP-71) 5.233 10.934 - 10.3 1.63
Lalin-Santiago (AP-53) 5.632 6.675 - 12.6 1.54
Fuengirola-San Roque (AP-7S) 18.024 32.432 - 11.1 1.40 
Jerez-Dos Hermanas (AP-4) 26.464 12.029 - 6.2 1.70 
Tui- A Coruña (AP-9) 31247 19.346 - 8.6 2.05 
Murcia-Albacete (A-30) - 1.247 14.335 0 1.67
Sevilla-Zamora (A-66) - 3.763 11.293 0 1.72
Huelva-Ayamonte (A-49) - 9.726 14.762 0 1.39
Valladolid-Portugal (A-62) - 1.076 10.476 0 1.96
Benavente-Ourense (A-52) - 2.793 10.446 0 1.74
Benavente-León (A-66) 3.549 10.964 0 1.24
Torrelavega-Santander (A-67) - 13.825 68.662 0 2.04
Zamora-Valladolid (A-11) - 2.183 6.946 0 1.37
Véjer-Chiclana (A-48) - 13.507 12.912 0 1.32
Ourense-Ponteares - 5.672 18.276 0 2.04
HIGH CAPACITY ROUTE % HEAVY 
(Market share for heavy vehicles) 
PRICE
(Cents € /Km) 
TIME LOSS RATIO  
(Minutes Free/Minutes Tolled) 
Toll Motorway Free National Road Free Motorway 
Barcelona-La Jonquera (AP-7) 85% 15% - 8.7 1.40 
Barcelona-Valencia (AP-7) 64% 36% - 10.3 1.78
Valencia-Alacant (AP-7) 54% 46% - 8.5 1.82
Barcelona-Lleida (AP-2) 44% 56% - 8.6 1.06
Lleida-Zaragoza (AP-2) 36% 64% - 8.6 1.66
León-Astorga (AP-71) 37% 63% - 10.3 1.63
Lalin-Santiago (AP-53) 49% 51% - 12.6 1.54
Fuengirola-San Roque (AP-7S) 49% 51% - 11.1 1.40 
Jerez-Dos Hermanas (AP-4) 42% 58% - 6.2 1.70
Tui- A Coruña (AP-9) 71% 29% - 8.6 2.05
Murcia-Albacete (A-30) - 5% 95% 0 1.67
Sevilla-Zamora (A-66) - 14% 86% 0 1.72
Huelva-Ayamonte (A-49) - 23% 77% 0 1.39
Valladolid-Portugal (A-62) - 8% 92% 0 1.96
Benavente-Ourense (A-52) - 8% 92% 0 1.74
Benavente-León (A-66) 20% 80% 0 1.24
Torrelavega-Santander (A-67) - 26% 74% 0 2.04
Zamora-Valladolid (A-11) - 26% 74% 0 1.37
Véjer-Chiclana (A-48) - 51% 49% 0 1.32
Ourense-Ponteares - 15% 85% 0 2.04
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HIGH CAPACITY ROUTE ACCIDENTS  
(Number of accidents involving victims per section and 
corrected by 1,000 average daily traffic) 
PRICE
(Cents € /Km) 
TIME LOSS RATIO 
(Minutes Free/Minutes Tolled) 
Toll Motorway Free National Road Free Motorway 
Barcelona-La Jonquera (AP-7) 0.03 0.10 - 8.7 1.40 
Barcelona-Valencia (AP-7) 0.03 0.06 - 10.3 1.78
Valencia-Alacant (AP-7) 0.03 0.11 - 8.5 1.82 
Barcelona-Lleida (AP-2) 0.03 0.03 - 8.6 1.06 
Lleida-Zaragoza (AP-2) 0.02 0.04 - 8.6 1.66
León-Astorga (AP-71) 0.01 0.08 - 10.3 1.63
Lalin-Santiago (AP-53) 0.01 0.03 - 12.6 1.54
Fuengirola-San Roque (AP-7S) 0.02 0.04 - 11.1 1.40 
Jerez-Dos Hermanas (AP-4) 0.01 0.05 - 6.2 1.70 
Tui- A Coruña (AP-9) 0.02 0.05 - 8.6 2.05
Murcia-Albacete (A-30) - 0.03 0.01 0 1.67
Sevilla-Zamora (A-66) - 0.06 0.02 0 1.72
Huelva-Ayamonte (A-49) - 0.06 0.02 0 1.39
Valladolid-Portugal (A-62) - 0.12 0.03 0 1.96
Benavente-Ourense (A-52) - 0.03 0.02 0 1.74
Benavente-León (A-66) 0.04 0.03 0 1.24
Torrelavega-Santander (A-67) - 0.05 0.05 0 2.04
Zamora-Valladolid (A-11) - 0.02 0.01 0 1.37
Véjer-Chiclana (A-48) 0.04 0.02 0 1.30
Ourense-Ponteares - 0.04 0.01 0 2.04 
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